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HomeMy WebLinkAboutOrder on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss i STATE OF INDIANA HAMILTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT #3 SS: COUNTY OF HAMILTON CAUSE NO. 29D03- 0805 -MI -565 MIDWEST HOSPITALITY GROUP, INC., and MOTELS OF CARMEL, LLP, PETITIONER, Honorable David K. Najjar, Special Judge VS. THE CITY OF CARMEL, RESPONDENT, ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS This matter came before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). The Court, having reviewed the motion and being duly advised, now finds that the motion should be DENIED for the following reasons. 1. The Respondent makes three arguments for dismissal and claims that each argument constitutes independently sufficient justification for dismissal. The Respondent first claims that this Court has no jurisdiction over the Carmel Plan Commission because the Carmel Plan Commission was not a named party in the Petitioner's initial filing and was not named as a party by the Petitioner within a 30 day time period as required by I.C. §36 -7 -4 -1003. As such, the Respondent's argument is that the Carmel Plan Commission is not subject to service of process and is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. As its second argument, the Respondent claims that the Carmel Plan Commission is an indispensable party and that dismissal is proper when an indispensable party can not be joined. Finally, the Respondent argues that the Petitioner was required to strictly adhere to the statutory guidelines for appealing a decision of the Carmel Plan Commission and that failure to strictly adhere to the statutory guidelines requires dismissal. The Court has addressed each argument below. I. The Court has no jurisdiction over the Carmel Plan Commission because the Carmel Plan Commission was not named as a party within the statutorily provided 30 day time period as required by I.C. §36 -7 -4 -1003 and therefore, the Carmel Plan Commission is not subject to service of process or the jurisdiction of this Court. The Respondent argues for dismissal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6) because the Petitioner's claim, as originally presented to the Court, named the City of Carmel as the sole Defendant. The Carmel Plan Commission is the entity that made the administrative decision that is at issue in the present case and, as such, should have been named a party to the lawsuit. Indiana Code provides for administrative agencies such as the Carmel Plan Commission to sue and be sued in their own names. I.C. 36 -7 -4 -404. Additionally, the code sets a 30 day time period, from the date of final decision, in which to file an appeal with the Court. The Petitioner did file its claim within the 30 day time limit but did not name the Carmel Plan Commission as a Defendant. Because the Carmel Plan Commission was not named a party to the claim within the 30 day statutorily established time period, the Respondent questions whether the Court has jurisdiction over the Carmel Plan Commission. Indiana Trial Rule 19 covers joinder of parties and the Court agrees with the Respondent that under TR 19(a), the Carmel Plan Commission would be a party that is not subject to service of process, on this claim, after the 30 day time period elapsed. However, what Trial Rule 19(a) takes away from the Court, Trial Rules 19(b) and (f) give back. Trial Rule 19(f) provides an exception to 19(a). When the claim is against a governmental organization such as the Carmel Plan Commission, the Court may at any time require the omitted and proper governmental organization to be included. TR 19(f)(2) specifically contemplates situations in which a governmental organization is left out of the initial filing and provides for joinder of such an organization. Additionally, Trial Rule 15 provides for leave to amend to be liberally granted by the Court and relation back to the original date of filing where the amended complaint arises out of the original conduct, transaction, or occurrence. In this case the Petitioner filed for leave to amend its complaint in order to add the Carmel Plan Commission as a Defendant. The desired amendment is a product of the original transaction and, as such, relates back to the original date of filing. Certainly justice would be ill- served if the Court denied the Petitioner's request to amend and chose, instead, to allow the Respondent to have the suit finally determined on something other than the merits. II. The Carmel Plan Commission is an indispensable party and dismissal is proper when an indispensable party can not be joined. The failure of the Respondent's first argument for dismissal necessarily defeats the Respondent's second argument. Whether the Carmel Plan Commission is an indispensable party is unimportant where, as here, the party may be joined in the lawsuit. A determination of whether or not the Carmel Plan Commission is an indispensable party is only relevant when joinder of the party is not available. Nevertheless, the Court chooses to address the Respondent's second argument briefly. Assuming arguendo, that the Court agreed with the Respondent that the Carmel Plan Commission is not subject to the Court's jurisdiction, the Court would still not dismiss the case because the Carmel Plan Commission is not an indispensable party. Trial Rule 19(b) requires the Court to look at four factors in determining whether a party is indispensable. First, the Court finds that a judgment rendered in the absence of the Carmel Plan Commission would not be overly prejudicial to the Commission. The Commission had prior knowledge that one of its decisions is the subject of the present dispute because no less than three of the Commission's officers were served with notice of the appeal. Were the Commission at all concerned that its interests might be negatively affected, it could have sought to join as a party to the lawsuit to defend its rights. It is preferable to decide a case on its merits rather than on a technicality, and, as such, the Court weighs heavily against allowing the Carmel Plan Commission to escape an appeal to the Court, of which it was fully aware. Secondly, there would be little need to place restrictions or protective provisions in any judgment to avoid prejudice. The requested relief would not in any way affect the Commission's ability to continue doing its job in the community in the future. The subject of the dispute is an isolated decision of the Commission and an adverse judgment would not affect any other decisions the Commission has made or will make. Thirdly, a judgment rendered in the Carmel Plan Commission's absence can be adequate because the City of Carmel is a named party and the Carmel Plan Commission is a subordinate governmental entity of the City of Carmel. The Respondent argues that, absent joinder of the Carmel. Plan Commission, the Court would have no authority to order the Carmel Plan Commission to reverse its decision. However, this assumes that the only way to get the Carmel Plan Commission to act is by a court order directed to the Commission. An order directed to the City of Carmel would be sufficient because the City of Carmel can, in turn, order the Carmel Plan Commission, or any other subordinate governmental entity, to act. Therefore, even where the Carmel Plan Commission not a named party, an adverse judgment can still effectively be rendered and even satisfied by the Carmel Plan Commission. Finally, the Petitioner would be without an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed because no further process of review is available. The Court also notes that the legislative intent of the Rules allowing for dismissal of an action where joinder of an indispensable party is not allowed is to prevent a party from having adverse judgments rendered against it in situations where the party has no knowledge of the claims against it. In light of the fact that the Carmel Plan Commission had full and actual knowledge of the instant claim, Trial Rule 19 can not be appropriately invoked as an avenue for dismissal. III. The Petitioner was required to strictly adhere to the statutory guidelines for appealing a decision of the Carmel Plan Commission and failure to strictly adhere to the statutory guidelines requires dismissal. The Respondent argues for dismissal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(7) because the Petitioner did not strictly adhere to the statutory guidelines for appealing a decision of the Carmel Plan Commission. As mentioned above, I.C. 36 -7 -4 -404 provides for plan commissions, such as the Carmel Plan Commission, to sue and be sued in their own name. The Respondent argues that Indiana case law requires dismissal of a claim where the Petitioner does not strictly comply with the statutorily provided guidelines for bringing a claim. The Respondent cites multiple Indiana decisions in support of its position. The decisions that respondent cites have at least one common thread. Each of the cases cited deals with a failure to strictly adhere to I.C. 36 -7 -4 -1003 which is the statute that provides the process by which an appeal from a decision of a plan commission must be made. I.C. 36 -7 -4 -1003 does not mention the manner in which a party must be named in any way. The Respondent claims that a court is deprived of jurisdiction if the Petitioner fails to strictly comply with all statutory requirements, and cites Shipshewana Convenience Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of LaGrange County, 656 N.E.2d 812 (emphasis added) However, the Respondent misstates the scope of the Court's holding. The very first sentence of the opinion is telling. "We hold that strict compliance with the requirements of the statute governing appeals from decisions of boards of zoning appeals is necessary for the trial court to obtain jurisdiction over such cases. (emphasis added) Id. The language of the Court is very explicit in describing the breadth of the requirement for strict compliance. Petitioners must strictly comply with a single statute and that is the one governing appeals from decisions of boards of zoning appeals, which is I.C. 36 -7 -4- 1003. The second case the Respondent cited in support of its 12(b)(7) argument is Keil Chem. Co. v. Common Council of the City of Hammond, Indiana, 612 N.E. 2d 209. In Keil the Court was dealing with a failure of verification, which is, again, covered under I.C. 36 -7 -4 -1003. The Respondent has made no claim that the Petitioner failed to strictly comply with I.C. 36 -7 -4 -1003. Rather, Respondent's petition for dismissal is based on an argument that the Petitioner failed to strictly comply with I.C. 36 -7 -4 -404. The Respondent's argument is not supported by case law and the Court is unwilling to dismiss the present action because justice would not be served by doing so. For all of the foregoing reasons the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Ordered this day of (-too cot._ ZCC) 1 David K. Najjar,,$ Judge Copies to all Counsel and the Parties